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Abstract
Background: Financial incentives are often used to influence professional practice, yet the factors which influence
their effectiveness and their behavioural mechanisms are not fully understood. In keeping with clinical guidelines,
Childsmile (Scotland’s oral health improvement programme) advocates twice yearly fluoride varnish application (FVA)
for children in dental practice. To support implementation Childsmile offered dental practitioners a fee-per-item
payment for varnishing 2–5-year-olds’ teeth through a pilot. In October 2011 payment was extended to all dental
practitioners. This paper compares FVA pre- and post-roll-out and explores the financial incentive’s behavioural
mechanisms.
Methods: A natural experimental approach using a longitudinal cohort of dental practitioners (n = 1090) compared
FVA pre- (time 1) and post- (time 2) financial incentive. Responses from practitioners who did not work in a Childsmile
pilot practice when considering their 2–5-year-old patients (novel incentive group) were compared with all other
responses (continuous incentive group). The Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) was used to measure change in
behavioural mechanisms associated with the incentive. Analysis of covariance was used to investigate FVA rates and
associated behavioural mechanisms in the two groups.
Results: At time 2, 709 74%, of eligible responders, were followed up. In general, FVA rates increased over time for both
groups; however, the novel incentive group experienced a greater increase (β [95% CI] = 0.82 [0.72 to 0.92]) than the
continuous incentive group. Despite this, only 33% of practitioners reported ‘always’ varnishing increased risk 2–5-year-olds’
teeth following introduction of the financial incentive, 19% for standard risk children. Domain scores at time 2 (adjusting for
time 1) increased more for the novel incentive group (compared to the continuous incentive group) for five domains:
knowledge, social/professional role and identity, beliefs about consequences, social influences and emotion.
Conclusions: In this large, prospective, population-wide study, a financial incentive moderately increased FVA in dental
practice. Novel longitudinal use of a validated theoretical framework to understand behavioural mechanisms suggested
that financial incentives operate through complex inter-linked belief systems. While financial incentives are useful in
narrowing the gap between clinical guidelines and FVA, multiple intervention approaches are required.
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Background
A substantive gap exists between what is known about
and what is done about improving health [1]. Profes-
sional guidelines translate the complexity of scientific re-
search results into recommendations that can enhance
healthcare [2, 3]. Yet despite widespread agreement that
guidelines are an essential foundation for effective health
care delivery [2, 4], studies frequently demonstrate low
compliance with guidelines [5–7]. This has led to an in-
creasing emphasis on attempts to identify and influence
the determinants of practice associated with guideline
adherence [2, 7–9].
Within this context, the ability of financial incen-
tives to influence professional practice and ultimately
improve patient outcomes has been widely considered.
Financial incentives may be used to increase the use
of evidence-based treatments or to stimulate behav-
iour change in relation to preventive, diagnostic and
treatment decisions [10]. However, despite ‘popular
opinion’ and frequent implementation, robust
evidence of the effectiveness of financial incentives as
a professional behaviour change strategy is limited
[10–12], and although there is evidence that financial
incentives are modified through indirect belief path-
ways [13], the mechanisms through which they oper-
ate are not fully understood [10].
Scotland’s child oral health improvement programme
(Childsmile) provided an opportunity to evaluate a fi-
nancial incentive aimed at increasing compliance with
clinical guidelines. Although preventable, dental caries is
the most common chronic disease of childhood [14, 15]
and a costly global problem which can impact on chil-
dren’s health and quality of life [16–18]. While the Scot-
tish Government’s preventive initiative (Childsmile) has
led to improvement in children’s oral health, consider-
able inequalities remain [19] and dental extractions are
the most common reason for elective hospital admis-
sions for children [20].
This paper focuses on a key component of Child-
smile—the application of fluoride varnish to children’s
teeth in dental practice. There is considerable evidence
that fluoride varnish application (FVA) can prevent
tooth decay when used in combination with regular
brushing with fluoride toothpaste [21–23]. Childsmile
advocates twice yearly FVA for children 2 years and over
in dental practice. This recommendation was under-
scored with the release of Scottish Dental Clinical Effect-
iveness Programme guidelines in 2010 [24].
Recognition that passive distribution of guidelines is
unlikely to result in uptake of desired behaviours by pro-
fessionals [25] and awareness of the dominant restora-
tive (rather than preventive) culture within dental
practice suggested the need to further encourage practi-
tioners to apply fluoride varnish to children’s teeth. At
this time, FVA was expected as part of a general capita-
tion fee. Building evidence supporting the widely held
belief that dentists in the UK (including Scotland) re-
spond to extrinsic rewards [26–29], and as small busi-
nesses exhibit self-interest [30], led Childsmile to
introduce a fee-per-item payment for practitioners who
applied varnish to the teeth of 2–5-year-olds. This pay-
ment was only available to practices who signed up to
Childsmile’s pilot programme which operated in West of
Scotland NHS boards. From July 2006 to September
2011, practices who signed up to Childsmile’s pilot could
claim £6 per application (within any 6-month period for
each individual child) for varnishing their child patients’
teeth. Practices submitted claim forms to Childsmile,
and payment was made, quarterly, via NHS National
Services Scotland.
In October 2011, as part of Childsmile’s national
roll-out, a fee-per-item payment for practitioners who
applied fluoride varnish to the teeth of their 2–5-year--
old patients was added into the NHS primary care dental
contract. Thus, since 2011, all dental practitioners have
been able to claim £6 per varnish application (within
any 6-month period for each individual child) in the
same way they are paid for all other ‘items of service’ by
NHS National Services Scotland [31]. Practitioners are
paid directly on submission of a claim form. Claims sub-
mitted by the end of the month are paid the first week
of the next month. This is largely an electronic process.
This change to the payment system was widely commu-
nicated to the dental profession [32, 33].
The staged roll-out of the financial incentive afforded
the opportunity to compare pre- and post-incentive FVA
rates and to further understand the mechanisms through
which financial incentives operate through a natural ex-
periment. In reporting this natural experiment, this
paper addresses two key questions. First, to what extent
did frequency of FVA differ pre- and post-introduction
of the financial incentive, and secondly, what are the
underlying mechanisms through which the financial in-
centive may have influenced FVA rates?
It was hypothesised a priori that a greater change
(from pre- to post-financial incentive) in frequency of
FVA would be observed for practitioners for whom the
ability to claim a fee-per-item payment was made avail-
able for the first time during the study period (those
who had not worked in a Childsmile pilot practice) when
considering delivery to 2–5-year-old patients (the age
group for whom payment was introduced).
Methods
Design and participants
A natural experimental approach using a
population-based longitudinal cohort of dental practi-
tioners was undertaken in dental practice in Scotland
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before (time 1) and after (time 2) the roll-out of a na-
tional financial incentive aimed at promoting FVA
through changes to the NHS primary care dental con-
tract. All active dental practitioners defined as those
who had submitted payment claims for dental services
to NHS National Services Scotland in the 6 months
prior to the roll-out were eligible to participate at time 1
(N = 2526). At time 2, all those who participated at time
1 (n = 1090) were asked to participate for a second time.
Measures
Demographics, behavioural outcome (FVA) and potential
mechanisms of behaviour change were measured at both
time points via postal questionnaire. The questionnaire
was piloted by a convenience sample of eight dental prac-
titioners to ensure clarity of wording and appropriate
structure and length. A few typographical errors were cor-
rected and minor changes made to the format. The time 1
questionnaire is available (Additional file 1). Measures and
format did not change at time 2.
Demographics
Standard protocol was used to measure practitioners’
professional status (principal dentist, associate dentist,
salaried dentist, locum assistant or a vocational trainee),
length of time practicing as a dentist (in years) and
whether they had worked in a Childsmile pilot practice
(yes/no) [34].
Three additional measures were obtained from the
Management Information Dental Accounting System
Database, NHS National Services Scotland, Information
Services Division, for all responding dental practitioners:
sex, age (in years) at time 1 and Scottish Index of Mul-
tiple Deprivation or SIMD (a national composite
area-based indicator of socioeconomic status) of practice
location (quintile 1 most deprived to 5 least deprived) at
time 1 [35].
Outcome measure (self-reported frequency of FVA)
The self-reported frequency of fluoride varnish applica-
tion to child patients (≤ 17 years) in dental practice was
measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale (never, at
very few appointments, at some appointments, at most
appointments, at every appointment), for clinically rele-
vant age, groups 2–5 years, 6–12 years and 13–17 years,
respectively, and for two categories of caries risk status
(standard and increased risk). Dental practitioners are
routinely responsible for assessing the caries risk status
(either standard or increased risk) of all their child pa-
tients via a full medical, dental and social history as out-
lined in professional guidelines [24, 36]. Caries
prevention should then be delivered accordingly [24].
Potential mechanisms of change
Approach to measurement The 12-domain Theoretical
Domains Framework (TDF) [37] was used to measure
the behaviour change mechanisms potentially operating
as a result of the introduction of the financial incentive.
The TDF was selected as a method of comprehensively
identifying psychological and organisational factors that
may influence the implementation of professional, in this
case dental practitioners’, behaviour [37–41].
Selection of theoretical domains In order to produce a
focussed, concise questionnaire and in keeping with
standard practice when using the TDF (e.g. [42–45]), a
consensus group determined which domains were rele-
vant to the behaviour being studied. A description of the
12 domains and their constructs is available [37]. The
consensus group comprised health psychologists and
other behavioural scientists, clinicians, dental public
health specialists, health services researchers, Childsmile
Executive members, policy makers and those involved in
the development of clinical oral health guidelines, all
with expertise in the implementation of evidence-based
dental behaviour.
The consensus group identified nine domains relevant
to FVA: knowledge, skills, social/professional role and
identity, beliefs about consequences, motivation and
goals (intention), environmental context and resources,
social influences (norms), emotion and behavioural regu-
lation. Three domains were not assessed. The domain
nature of the behaviour was excluded a priori as it re-
lates more to an understanding of the behaviour itself
than to influences on it. Beliefs about capabilities was
excluded as the consensus groups’ view was that dental
practitioners have the knowledge and skills necessary to
apply fluoride varnish. Finally, the domain, memory, at-
tention and decision processes was excluded. Since im-
plementation of guidelines pertaining to FVA in dental
practice stipulates that varnish should be applied to the
teeth of all children twice a year (and most children will
only attend practice twice a year), compliance with those
guidelines was viewed by the consensus group as leading
to automatic delivery (with a simple check of contraindi-
cations) at all routine appointments.
Assessment of the theoretical domains Constructs
within agreed domains [37] were considered by the con-
sensus group and individual questionnaire items devel-
oped to measure those constructs of relevance to the
target group, behaviour and setting. As per standard
practice (e.g. [42, 45, 46]), established items measuring
the agreed constructs were drawn from existing litera-
ture [37] then tailored to the target group, behaviour
and setting.
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The consensus group reviewed items to ensure clarity
and item fit within domains. By design, the number of
items per domain reflected the likely influence of that
domain as viewed by the consensus group. The more in-
fluential the domain was perceived to be, the more ques-
tionnaire items it had associated with it. Resultant items
were both positively and negatively phrased and mea-
sured on a 7-point Likert scale. Negative items were re-
verse scored. The items comprising each domain, and
for multi-item scales an estimate of their internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha, calculated at time 1), are
presented in Additional file 2.
Financial items Two items specifically related to the fi-
nancial incentive were included. Respondents were asked
(on a 7-point Likert-type scale) to what extent they
agreed or disagreed with the following: In general, apply-
ing fluoride varnish to my child patients twice a year (as
supported by current Scottish Dental Clinical Effective-
ness Programme guidelines [24]) (1) ‘is something I re-
ceive appropriate compensation to do’ and (2) ‘would
increase in my practice if it was more financially reward-
ing’, while considering patient age group (2–5, 6–12 and
13–17 years). Both financial items were included in the
domain ‘beliefs about consequences’.
Survey administration
NHS Scotland’s National Services Scotland, Information
Services Division, provided a list of eligible dental practi-
tioners and their contact details. Practitioners undertak-
ing only orthodontic or emergency work, along with
those whose list numbers were classified as temporary
or locum, were excluded.
Time 1 questionnaires were first sent out on 2 August
2011. This was followed by two postal follow-ups for
non-responders. Nearly all completed time 1 question-
naires were received by October 2011 (11 were received
shortly after this date). At time 2, questionnaires were
sent out on 1 February 2013 with two further postal
follow-ups of non-responders. All time 2 questionnaires
were received by June 2013. At both time points, prac-
tices with non-responders were contacted by phone to
confirm contact details and encourage participation.
Questionnaires were included in all mailings.
Statistical analyses
All statistical analyses were carried out in Stata IC (Sta-
taCorp, V14). A 10% random sample was double-entered
to identify any systematic data entry errors. None were
found. Items comprising each domain were scored posi-
tively, summed and an average ‘domain score’ calculated
for each respondent.
Categorical data were summarised using percentages
and numerical data using means (standard deviations/
95% confidence intervals) or medians (Q1, Q3) depend-
ing on distributional assumptions.
FVA rates were reported using a Likert scale and were
then converted to numerical scores (Never = 0, Few = 1,
Some = 2, Most = 3, Every = 4).
Responses from practitioners who did not work in a
Childsmile pilot practice when considering their 2–
5-year-old patients (novel incentive group) were com-
pared with all other responses (continuous incentive
group). The continuous incentive group comprised re-
sponses from practitioners who had worked in a Child-
smile pilot practice when reporting FVA for all age
groups and those from practitioners who had not
worked in a Childsmile pilot practice when considering
FVA to patients 6 years and older.
Assessing the effect of the financial incentive on FVA at
time 2
An analysis of covariance model was used to test for a
difference between the novel and continuous incentive
groups in FVA at time 2 controlling for time 1 FVA and
caries risk category.
Assessing the mechanisms of the financial incentive
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to test
for differences between the novel and continuous incen-
tive groups in each of the nine theoretical domains at
time 2, adjusted for time 1 and caries risk category. To
account for multiple testing a p value of < 0.00001 was
used. A similar approach was taken for the individual fi-
nancial item measuring practitioners’ perceptions that
they received appropriate compensation for applying
fluoride varnish to their child patients’ teeth. This rela-
tionship was explored in isolation since this variable was
hypothesised a priori to represent key mechanisms
through which the financial incentive may operate.
Clustering of dental practitioners within practices was
accounted for using the cluster command in Stata, with
robust standard errors throughout. The intra-cluster
correlation (ICC) for the primary analysis was
calculated.
Results
Response rate
Of 2526 surveys sent out at time 1, 491 were subsequently
identified as ineligible. One thousand ninety practitioners
responded (54% of those eligible (N = 2035)). The
methods and results of the time 1 survey have been pub-
lished previously including the characteristics of re-
sponders versus non-responders [44]. At time 1,
responders were younger, had qualified more recently and
were more likely to be female and more likely to work in a
Childsmile pilot practice.
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At time 2, 129 practitioners from the time 1 cohort of
1090 dental practitioners were identified as ineligible (85
letters were undeliverable and 44 practitioners were not
currently treating children). Seven hundred nine, 74%, of
the time 1 responders eligible at time 2 were followed
up approximately 1 year later (time 2). This represented
37% of those originally asked who were not known to be
ineligible at either time 1 or time 2. Approximately half
(n = 350) had worked in a Childsmile pilot practice.
There was little difference in key characteristics of re-
sponders versus non-responders (Table 1).
FVA pre- and post-financial incentive
Figure 1 presents the frequencies of self-reported FVA at
time 1 and time 2 for the 709 dental practitioners who
responded at both time points stratified by age group
(2–5 years; 6–12 years; 13–17 years), category of risk
(standard; increased) and whether the respondent had
worked in a Childsmile pilot practice (yes/no). Clear dif-
ferences in fluoride varnish rates emerged between
groups (type of practice, patients’ age group and caries
risk category) and over time.
As Fig. 1 shows, even when incentivised, self-reported
FVA rates at time 2 suggest that only a third of practi-
tioners ‘always’ apply varnish to the teeth of increased car-
ies risk patients and less than a fifth (19%) ‘always’ apply
varnish to those children assessed as having a standard
risk of developing caries. However, 40% of those that had
worked in a Childsmile pilot practice reported applying
fluoride varnish ‘at most’ appointments for increased risk
children at time 2. This figure fell to 32% for those chil-
dren perceived to be at standard risk. Comparable time 2
figures for those practitioners who had not worked in a
Childsmile pilot practice were 37% for increased and 26%
for standard risk children. Reported varnish rates were
lower for older children (Additional file 3). For example,
only 1% of dental practitioners working in a Childsmile
pilot practice reported applying fluoride varnish to their
standard risk 13–17-year-old patients at every visit at time
1. This did not change at time 2.
After adjusting for FVA rates at time 1 and caries risk
category, reported FVA rates at time 2 were higher on
average for those in the novel incentive group compared
to those in the continuous incentive group (β [95% CI]
= 0.82 [0.72 to 0.92]). This reflected a change of almost
one category on the Likert scale between the novel in-
centive and continuous incentive groups at time 2. The
ICC was 0.34, 95% CI = [0.31 to 0.37].
Mechanisms of change
Theoretical domains
The mean change in all nine domain scores between
time 1 and time 2 stratified by child age group and
whether the dental practitioner worked in a Childsmile
pilot practice is shown in Table 2.
For the domains social/professional role and identity,
beliefs about consequences, environmental context and
resources, social influences and emotion, all mean scores
increased between baseline and follow-up. With the ex-
ception of two domains (skills and behavioural regula-
tion), there was a greater increase (or lesser decrease) in
domain scores over time for those practitioners who had
Table 1 Characteristics of respondents at time 1 and time 2.
Variables are self-reported from the time 1 study survey with the
exception of sex, age and SIMD of practice which were extracted
from the Management Information Dental Accounting System
Database NHS National Services Scotland, Information Services
Division, at the end of March 2011
Time 1 N = 1090 Time 2 N = 709
Professional status at time 1
Principal dentist 38.6 (421) 39.8 (282)
Associate dentist 51.7 (564) 51.1 (362)
Salaried dentist 9.3 (101) 8.8 (62)
Vocational trainee 0.2 (2) 0.1 (1)
Associate + salaried 0.1 (1) 0.1 (1)
Missing 1 1
Working/worked in a Childsmile pilot practice
No 51.5 (557) 50.5 (350)
Yes 48.5 (525) 49.5 (343)
Missing 8 16
Length of time practicing years at time 1
Median (Q1, Q3) 15 [6, 25] 16 [6, 25]
Min, max 1 to 46 1 to 46
Mean (SD) 16.4 (10.6) 16.4 (10.4)
Missing 17 10
Sex
Male 52.8 (559) 50.0 (344)
Female 47.2 (500) 50.0 (344)
Missing 31 21
Age (years) at time 1
Median (Q1, Q3) 39 (30, 49) 40 (30, 48)
Min, max 23, 67 23, 67
Mean (SD) 39.9 (10.6) 39.9 (10.3)
Missing 31 21
SIMD quintile of practice (national) at time 1
Q1—most deprived 21.4 (226) 21.3 (146)
Q2 27.0 (285) 26.8 (184)
Q3 20.2 (214) 18.5 (127)
Q4 15.0 (159) 16.6 (114)
Q5—least deprived 16.4 (173) 16.9 (116)
Missing 33 22
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not worked in a Childsmile pilot practice when consider-
ing their 2–5-year-old patients.
After adjusting for baseline scores in the TDF domains
and caries risk category, changes in the novel incentive
group (compared to the continuous incentive group)
were greater for the following domains: knowledge (β
[95% CI] = 0.31 [0.25 to 0.37]; + 1/3 of a unit along the
Likert scale), social/professional role and identity (β
[95% CI] = 0.47 [0.41 to 0.53]; + 1/2), beliefs about con-
sequences (β [95% CI] = 0.35 [0.31 to 0.39]; + 1/3), social
influences (β [95% CI] = 0.25 [0.21 to 0.29]; + 1/4) and
emotion (β [95% CI] = 0.42 [0.34 to 0.49]; + 2/5)
(Table 3).
Individual financial items
For the financial item (FVA) is something I receive appropri-
ate financial compensation to do, all but one mean score
was below 4, with most below 3, suggesting that the finan-
cial reward in place was not considered adequate compensa-
tion to a greater or lesser degree (Table 2). On average,
there was a greater increase in agreement with this item
over time (time 2 − time 1) when those practitioners who
had not worked in a Childsmile pilot practice considered
their 2–5-year-old patients. An ANCOVA modelling score
on this item at time 2, adjusted for time 1 and caries risk
category, confirmed that those in the novel incentive group
showed greater improvement in scores compared to the
continuous incentive group (β [95% CI] = 0.98 [0.83 to 1.14];
+ 1 unit along the Likert scale) (Table 2).
For the financial item (FVA) would increase in my
practice if it was more financially rewarding, mean
scores ranged from 4.60 to 5.28, although not strong,
suggesting some extent of agreement with this item
(Table 2).
Discussion
The aim of this large, prospective, population-wide study
was to assess the effect of a financial incentive designed
to increase delivery of fluoride varnish to children’s teeth
in dental practice in Scotland in line with clinical guide-
lines. This paper considers, first, change in frequency of
FVA pre- and post-introduction of the financial incen-
tive and, second, the potential mechanisms of change
through which the incentive may have influenced pre-
ventive practice. While introduction of a financial incen-
tive was found to increase FVA rates, the low magnitude
of change over time suggests a need for further interven-
tion. Novel use of a validated theoretical framework to
understand mechanisms of change suggested that finan-
cial incentives operate through complex inter-linked be-
lief systems.
Change in FVA (pre- to post-financial incentive)
Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme guide-
lines advocate the application of fluoride varnish twice a
Fig. 1 Fluoride varnish application for 2–5-year-olds by caries risk and Childsmile pilot practice status
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year to the teeth of all children 2 years of age and over
(irrespective of caries risk) who attend general dental
practice. Yet, even when a fee-per-item payment was
made available, dental practitioners’ self-reported FVA
rates suggested that only a third apply varnish to the
teeth of increased caries risk patients at every visit and
less than a fifth to those children assessed as having a
standard risk of developing caries. Reported varnish
rates were even lower for older children. While this
study measured frequency of FVA on an ordinal scale, it
would be expected that since most children will not at-
tend practice more than twice a year, practitioners would
have to apply varnish at ‘every’ appointment if guidelines
are to be met. These findings concur with recent na-
tional data showing that in 2015/2016, just 18% of 2–
5-year-old children registered with a dentist received
two applications of fluoride varnish per year [47].
Nonetheless, sub-group changes in FVA rates over
time demonstrated a pattern commensurate with a posi-
tive effect of the financial incentive. The biggest increase
in FVA was reported by practitioners who had not
worked in a Childsmile pilot practice when considering
2–5-year-old patients, the age group for which a fee was
introduced.
While the findings provide some support for growing evi-
dence of the influence of remuneration on healthcare pro-
fessionals, including dentists’ behaviour [10, 11, 27–29, 48],
the low absolute rates of FVA and low magnitude of change
over time suggest there is still a need for further interven-
tion to ensure all children in Scotland are getting preventive
treatment in line with clinical guidelines.
Mechanisms of the financial incentive
Trends in domain scores over time generally showed a
greater positive shift in beliefs which may influence
FVA, when those practitioners who had not worked in a
Childsmile pilot practice considered their 2–5-year-old
patients, than for all other responses. This pattern of re-
sults is in keeping with a positive effect of introducing a
financial incentive.
After adjusting for time 1 scores in the TDF domains,
changes in the novel incentive group (compared to the
continuous incentive group) were greater for five do-
mains (knowledge, social/professional role and identity,
beliefs about consequences, social influences and emo-
tion). Beliefs related to constructs within these domains
may have been influenced by the introduction of the fi-
nancial incentive during the study period.
The greatest increase in domain scores for the novel
(compared to continuous) incentive group was seen for
change in the domain social/professional role and iden-
tity which measured practitioners’ beliefs that FVA was
an important part of their own (or their team’s role). It
is plausible that offering a fee-for-service payment for
FVA may reinforce practitioners’ beliefs that varnish ap-
plication was their responsibility. The influence of this
domain in predicting dental practitioners’ preventive
practice has been previously established [13, 45] and an
association between perceived professional role and the
effectiveness of financial rewards found [49].
Emotion had the second biggest positive difference in
domain scores over time for the novel versus continuous
incentive groups. This domain was measured by a single
item asking practitioners to what extent applying varnish
to the teeth of their child patients at least twice a year
was something they really wanted to do. Again, it seems
Table 3 Results of analysis of covariance for domain scores and
financial item at time 2, adjusted for time 1 and caries risk
category for the novel and continuous incentive groups
TDF domain β 95% CI p value
Knowledge
Time 1 covariate 0.25 0.22 0.28
Novel incentive effect 0.31 0.25 0.37 < 0.00001
Skills
Time 1 covariate 0.47 0.38 0.43
Novel incentive effect − 1.05 − 1.2 − 0.9 < 0.00001
Social/professional role and identity
Time 1 covariate 0.64 0.60 0.67
Novel incentive effect 0.47 0.41 0.53 < 0.00001
Beliefs about consequences
Time 1 covariate 0.60 0.57 0.64
Novel incentive effect 0.35 0.31 0.39 < 0.00001
Motivation and goals
Time 1 covariate 0.35 0.32 0.38
Novel incentive effect 0.001 − 0.07 0.07 0.954
Environmental context and resources
Time 1 covariate 0.25 0.21 0.29
Novel incentive effect 0.02 − 0.01 0.04 0.277
Social influences
Time 1 covariate 0.40 0.36 0.44
Novel incentive effect 0.25 0.21 0.29 < 0.00001
Emotion
Time 1 covariate 0.42 0.39 0.46
Novel incentive effect 0.42 0.34 0.49 < 0.00001
Behavioural regulation
Time 1 covariate 0.20 0.17 0.23
Novel incentive effect − 0.001 − 0.07 0.07 0.984
Financial compensation +
Time 1 covariate 0.37 0.33 0.40
Novel incentive effect 0.98 0.83 1.14 < 0.00001
+Extent of agreement or disagreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale that
‘applying FV is something I receive appropriate financial compensation to do’
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intuitive that the introduction of a specific fee for apply-
ing varnish may increase practitioner’s agreement with
this statement.
Scores in the knowledge domain at time 2 (controlling
for time 1) were also found to have a greater positive in-
crease in the novel incentive group. It may be that inclu-
sion of a specific payment for FVA has underscored that
applying varnish twice a year is supported by clinical
guidelines and/or that introduction of the incentive may
have prompted practitioners to further educate themselves
in relation to relevant guidelines. Knowledge that varnish
is advocated in current guidelines has been found to be as-
sociated with varnish application rates [44].
In light of the financial nature of the intervention and
studies highlighting the importance of the domain ‘be-
liefs about consequences’ [43, 50–52], in influencing
professional behaviour, it is unsurprising that change in
this domain was also greater in the novel incentive
group. However, the difference between groups was not
as great as for the domains social/professional role and
identity and emotion. This domain measured anticipated
consequences for the practitioner, their practice and
their patients including perceived financial gain.
The final domain that showed a greater positive in-
crease between time 1 and time 2 for the novel (com-
pared to continuous) incentive group was social
influences. This domain measured practitioners’ percep-
tions of whether their patients and colleagues wanted
varnish applied. That decisions to deliver care are influ-
enced by colleagues and patients has been previously
demonstrated for a range of professional behaviours in-
cluding FVA [43, 45, 50, 51]. The presence of a financial
incentive may influence the extent to which FVA is
viewed as desired by others. While this finding is diffi-
cult to interpret, it may be that the influence of this do-
main is due to increased collegiate desire of varnish
application due to the financial incentive.
Individual analysis of the financial variable represent-
ing practitioners’ views of whether they received appro-
priate financial compensation for applying varnish to
their child patient’s teeth were commensurate with a
positive effect of the incentive. There was a greater posi-
tive change in practitioners’ agreement that they re-
ceived appropriate compensation (at time 2 accounting
for time1 scores) for the novel incentive group.
However, it is worth noting that even when the option
of claiming a fee per item for applying varnish was open
to them, in general, dental practitioners agreed that FVA
would increase in their practice if they were paid more.
This suggests that at least some practitioners did not con-
sider the fee sufficient to compensate them. This is in
keeping with a qualitative study of Scottish dental practi-
tioners which found that the fee was insufficient to remu-
nerate them for the time involved [13]. This qualitative
study also found that the process of claiming a payment
could inhibit FVA. A higher fee may have had a larger im-
pact on the beliefs that influence decision-making and dif-
ficulty with the claim system or even perceptions of the
difficulty of claiming could have mitigated against a larger
intervention effect. Exploring the extent to which the
monetary value of the fee and the process for claiming it
influenced its effectiveness was beyond the scope of this
study.
The importance of considering the appropriate
amount of incentive is often raised, although few studies
have compared financial incentives of different strengths
[10, 11, 53]. The appropriate amount of financial reward
and the likely success of the intervention will depend on
the context within which the incentive is operationalised.
For example, an interaction between the value placed on
a behaviour and incentive strength has been proposed. It
may be that a weak incentive to perform a valued behav-
iour is more effective than a strong incentive to perform
a behaviour that is not regarded important [10]. The fi-
nancial incentive within this study was operationalised
within the context of an engrained restorative culture
within dental practice in Scotland.
Overall, the results suggest that financial incentives im-
pact on professional behaviour by influencing complex
inter-linked belief systems. In contrast to the sole mechan-
ism being the expectation of direct financial reward, it
seems that the introduction of a monetary payment influ-
enced practice through changes to dental practitioners’
wider perceptions relating to the context and culture in
which they work. While the mechanisms through which
financial incentives change behaviour have been
under-theorised and investigated, the findings are in keep-
ing with evidence that incentives operate through indirect
belief pathways, for example by normalising or validating
the behaviour as part of the professional’s role [13].
Strengths and limitations
This study has several strengths, not least its scale. Its
focus was a population-wide intervention, with explana-
tory and response variables measured through a census
of dental practitioners and their longitudinal follow-up.
The study benefitted from external validity and added
to inconclusive literature on the effectiveness of financial
incentives as a guideline implementation strategy. While
the response rate at time 2 (74%) was very favourable
when compared with contemporary surveys of dental
practitioners (which achieved returns ranging from 29 to
45%) [45, 54, 55], just 37% of those originally asked (and
who were not known to be ineligible) remained in the
cohort. Selection bias cannot therefore be ruled out.
In addition, the national roll-out of the financial incen-
tive precluded a randomised research design. The div-
ision of practices at time 1 to Childsmile pilot practices
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(where dental practitioners could claim a direct fee for
varnishing their child patients’ teeth) versus all other
practices (with no fee offered) provided a ‘natural’ inter-
vention (novel incentive) and control (continuous incen-
tive) group. However, since these groups had known and
possibly unknown differences and secular trends may
have influenced the results, caution in attribution and
interpretation of outcomes is warranted. While the pro-
spective cohort provides some confidence in the tempor-
ality of observed relationships, direct causality could not
be inferred.
This study addressed the paucity of literature illumin-
ating mechanisms through which financial incentives
operate [10, 12], importantly through the use of a vali-
dated framework. Moreover, while the TDF has been
used prospectively to facilitate implementation of health
interventions and retrospectively in theory-based process
evaluation [40, 56], its longitudinal use to explore behav-
ioural mechanisms over time was novel. Given that the
TDF has proven to be a comprehensive, flexible tool
shown to facilitate better understanding of the pathways
through which behavioural change occurs [40, 41, 56],
its use was an innovative but appropriate way to further
understand how financial incentives operate.
However, although this study added to the evidence
that the TDF can be used across different settings and in
different ways to better understand the implementation
of interventions [41, 56], the interpretation of results
was sometimes difficult. While a quantitative approach
was chosen as it facilitated population-wide investiga-
tion, with hindsight, a mixed-methods approach incorp-
orating a longitudinal qualitative sub-cohort would have
provided further insight into the complex behavioural
mechanisms underpinning the intervention.
Additionally, while a priori specification of the behav-
ioural domains likely to act as behavioural mechanism of
the financial incentive may have strengthened attribu-
tional arguments and may have been possible on the
basis of consensus group expertise, a broader explora-
tory approach (with the exception of initial domain ex-
clusion) was adopted due to the novel nature of utilising
the TDF to explain the mechanisms of an intervention
longitudinally and lack of robust research evidence spe-
cific to the study setting on which to inform hypothesis.
The consensual nature of the TDF approach also
merits consideration. Initial domain selection and the se-
lection of narrow items to assess broad domains, al-
though informed by experts, were subjective. Moreover,
although internal consistency of domains was high and
expert input ensured that measures were specifically
relevant to FVA, the allocation of items to domains may
elicit theoretical debate [42].
Finally, the nature of the behavioural measure compris-
ing the main study outcome (FVA) is worth considering.
It was not possible to obtain an objective measure of FVA
for all dental practitioners at the outset of this study, in-
stead relying on self-report. However, there is no strong
basis for the hypothesis that self-report bias would change
between time 1 and time 2 or that there would be differ-
ential bias (or change in bias) between Childsmile pilot
and non-pilot practices.
Further research
There are calls for further robust randomised studies to
assess the impact of financial incentives on professional
behaviour [10, 11]. While this is key, in keeping with re-
cent guidance on the evaluation of complex interven-
tions [57], such studies would benefit from a critical
realist perspective combining a focus on rigorous meas-
urement of outcomes with further, qualitative or mixed
methods effort, underpinned by theory, to fully under-
stand the mechanisms through which financial incen-
tives work. Quantitative studies using the TDF would
benefit from building on, now available, validated mea-
sures [58].
Future studies should consider the strength of the fi-
nancial incentive, ensure that the claim process does not
mitigate against the intervention and consider the con-
text in which the incentive is introduced. It is important
to determine the minimal incentive required to effect
change in order that policy makers can implement the
most cost-effective strategy. Additionally, the introduc-
tion of a fee-for-service payment for FVA into the NHS
primary care dental contract gives the potential to use
an objective measure of FVA in the future.
Finally, further intervention is needed to ensure chil-
dren in Scotland are getting preventive treatment in line
with clinical guidelines. This study and others utilising
the time 1 data reported in this paper have gone some-
way to informing the approach required [13, 44, 45], but
further work is needed to develop and test theoretically
informed interventions.
Conclusion
This large population-wide study demonstrated a posi-
tive association between the introduction of a financial
incentive and dental practitioners’ compliance with FVA
guidelines. However, the low levels of FVA
post-incentive and the small magnitude of change in
FVA evidences further need to increase the frequency
with which dental professionals in Scotland apply fluor-
ide varnish. Novel longitudinal use of the TDF suggested
that financial incentives operate by altering complex
inter-linked belief systems. While financial incentives are
likely to be a component of a successful intervention
strategy, multiple approaches are required to narrow the
gap between practitioners’ behaviour and current clinical
guidelines.
Gnich et al. Implementation Science  (2018) 13:95 Page 10 of 12
Additional files
Additional file 1: Survey questionnaire. (PDF 282 kb)
Additional file 2: Item composition of theoretical domain scales.
(DOC 61 kb)
Additional file 3: Frequency of fluoride varnish application for children
6 years and over by caries risk and Childsmile pilot practice status at time
1 and time 2. (DOCX 92 kb)
Abbreviations
FVA(s): Fluoride varnish application(s); NHS: National Health Service;
TDF: Theoretical Domains Framework
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all practitioners who responded to the
survey. We recognise the contribution of NHS National Services Scotland in
providing data from the Management Information Dental Accounting
System database, Jamie Kidd (Glasgow University) for organising the
Management Information Dental Accounting System data and Linda Young
(NES) for her advice in the initial stages of survey administration.
Funding
The study was undertaken as part of the national evaluation of Childsmile
(funded by the Scottish Government). The views expressed in the paper are
those of the authors and may not be shared by the funders.
Availability of data and materials
The datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available
from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Authors’ contributions
All authors conceived of the study and contributed to its design. DB and WG
developed the survey instruments. WG oversaw administration of the survey.
AS and WG planned and AS conducted the statistical analysis. All authors
interpreted the results. WG and AS drafted the manuscript and all authors
discussed content, commented on drafts and approved the final version.
Authors’ information
All authors except DB are based at the Community Oral Health Section at
the University of Glasgow’s Dental School. WG is a research fellow in the
evaluation of child oral health demonstration programmes, AS is a senior
lecturer in Statistics and DC and LM are professors in Dental Public Health.
All authors based at Glasgow University are members of a larger evaluation
team funded to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of Childsmile. DB is a
senior research fellow in the dental health services research unit at the
University of Dundee.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
The West of Scotland Research Ethics Service advised that under the terms
of the governance arrangements for research ethics committees in the UK,
NHS ethical review was not required. Glasgow University Medical, Veterinary
and Life Sciences (MVLS) Faculty Ethics committee approved the evaluation
of Childsmile of which this study comprises one component. NHS clinical
governance approval was obtained. Respondents were informed as to how
the information they provided would be used and consented through
participation.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Community Oral Health Section, School of Medicine, Dentistry and Nursing,
College of Medicine, Veterinary and Life Sciences (MVLS), University of
Glasgow, 378 Sauchiehall Street, Glasgow G2 3JZ, UK. 2Dental Health Services
Research Unit, Dundee Dental Education Centre, Frankland Building, Small’s
Wynd, Dundee DD1 4HN, UK.
Received: 14 September 2017 Accepted: 5 June 2018
References
1. Holmes B, Scarrow G, Schellenberg M. Translating evidence into practice:
the role of health research funders. Implement Sci. 2012;7:39.
2. Shekelle P, Woolf S, Grimshaw JM, Schunemann HJ, Eccles MP. Developing
clinical practice guidelines: reviewing, reporting, and publishing guidelines;
updating guidelines; and the emerging issues of enhancing guideline
implementability and accounting for comorbid conditions in guideline
development. Implement Sci. 2012;7:62.
3. Institute of Medicine. Clinical practice guidelines we can trust. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press; 2011.
4. Francke AL, Smit MC, de Veer AJ, Mistiaen P. Factors influencing the
implementation of clinical guidelines for health care professionals: a
systematic meta-review. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak. 2008;8:38.
5. Gagliardi AR, Brouwers MC, Palda VA, Lemieux-Charles L, Grimshaw JM. How
can we improve guideline use? A conceptual framework of
implementability. Implement Sci. 2011;6:26.
6. Grimshaw J, Eccles M, Thomas R, MacLennan G, Ramsay C, Fraser C, Vale L.
Toward evidence-based quality improvement. Evidence (and its limitations)
of the effectiveness of guideline dissemination and implementation
strategies 1966–1998. J Gen Intern Med. 2006;21(Suppl 2):S14–20.
7. Grol R, Wensing M. What drives change? Barriers to and incentives for
achieving evidence-based practice. Med J Aust. 2004;180(6 Suppl):S57–60.
8. Clarkson JE, Ramsay CR, Eccles MP, Eldridge S, Grimshaw JM, Johnston M,
Michie S, Treweek S, Walker A, Young L, et al. The translation research in a
dental setting (TRiaDS) programme protocol. Implement Sci. 2010;5:57.
9. Rainbird K, Sanson-Fisher R, Buchan H. Identifying barriers to evidence
uptake. Melbourne: National Institute of Clinical Studies (NICS); 2006.
10. Flodgren G, Eccles MP, Shepperd S, Scott A, Parmelli E, Beyer FR. An
overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in
changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes.
Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2011:CD009255. https://doi.org/10.1002/
14651858.CD009255.
11. Brocklehurst P, Price J, Glenny AM, Tickle M, Birch S, Mertz E, Grytten J. The
effect of different methods of remuneration on the behaviour of primary
care dentists. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2013;6:11.
12. McDonald R. Paying for performance in healthcare organisations. Int J
Health Policy Manag. 2014;2:59–60.
13. Ross A, Sherriff A, Kidd J, Gnich W, Deas L, Anderson, Macpherson LM: A
systems analysis of fluoride varnish application in general dental practice in
Scotland using the functional resonance analysis method. Appl Ergon 2018,
68: 294–303.
14. Petersen PE. The World Oral Health report: continuous improvement of oral
health in the 21st century—the approach of the WHO Global Oral Health
Programme. Community Dent Oral Epidemiol. 2003;31:3–24.
15. Bagramian RA, Garcia-Godoy F, Volpe AR. The global increase in dental
caries: a pending public health crisis. Am J Dent. 2009;22:3–8.
16. Locker D, Jokovic A, Stephens M, Kenny D, Tompson B, Guyatt G. Family
impact of child oral and oral-facial conditions. Community Dent Oral
Epidemiol. 2002;30:438–48.
17. Sheiham A. Dental caries affects body weight, growth and quality of life in
pre-school children. Br Dent J. 2006;201:625–6.
18. Nuttal NM, Steele JG, Evans D, Chadwick B, Morris AJ, Hill K. The reported
impact of oral condition on children in the United Kingdom. Br Dent J.
2003;200:551–5.
19. Macpherson LM, Anopa Y, Conway DI, McMahon A. National supervised
toothbrushing program and dental decay in Scotland. J Dent Res. 2012;
20. Childhood admissions summary by health board of residence and speciality.
Available from: http://www.isdscotland.org/Health-Topics/Hospital-Care/
Inpatient-and-Day-Case-Activity/ Accessed 12 Sept 2017.
21. Marinho VC, Higgins JP, Sheiham A, Logan S. Combinations of topical
fluoride (toothpastes, mouthrinses, gels, varnishes) versus single topical
fluoride for preventing dental caries in children and adolescents. Cochrane
Database Syst Rev. 2004;1:CD002781.
22. Marinho VC. Cochrane reviews of randomized trials of fluoride therapies for
preventing dental caries. Eur Arch Paediatr Dent. 2009;10:183–91.
Gnich et al. Implementation Science  (2018) 13:95 Page 11 of 12
23. Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network: Prevention and management of
dental decay in the pre-school child: a national clinical guideline. 2005.
24. Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme. Prevention and
management of dental caries in children: dental clinical guidance. Dundee:
Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme; 2010.
25. Grimshaw JM, Thomas RE, MacLennan G, Fraser C, Ramsay CR, Vale L, Whitty
P, Eccles MP, Matowe L, Shirran L, et al. Effectiveness and efficiency of
guideline dissemination and implementation strategies. Health Technol
Assess. 2004;8(6):iii-iv, 1–72.
26. Crossley ML, Mubarik A. A comparative investigation of dental and medical
student’s motivation towards career choice. Br Dent J. 2002;193:471–3.
27. Chalkley M, Tilley C. Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists
in the British National Health Service. Health Econ. 2006;15:933–46.
28. Chalkley M, Tilley C, Young L, Bonetti D, Clarkson J. Incentives for dentists in
public service: evidence from a natural experiment. J Public Adm Res
Theory. 2010;20:1207–23.
29. Clarkson JE, Turner S, Grimshaw JM, Ramsay CR, Johnston M, Scott A,
Bonetti D, Tilley CJ, Maclennan G, Ibbetson R, et al. Changing clinicians’
behavior: a randomized controlled trial of fees and education. J Dent Res.
2008;87:640–4.
30. Crilly T, Le Grand JJ. The motivation and behaviour of hospital trusts. Soc
Sci Med. 2004;58:1809–23.
31. NHS General Servies Scotland. Statement of Dental Remuneration.
Amendment No 135. October 2017. http://www.scottishdental.org/
professional/statement-of-dental-remuneration. Accessed 31 Mar 2018.
32. Childsmile Dental Remuneration Booklet. NHS Health Scotland 2011. http://
www.childsmile.org.uk/professionals/information-for-dental-practice-staff.
aspx. Accessed 31 Mar 2018.
33. Health and Social Care Directorate CDO Letter NHS PCA(D)(2011)5 Scottish
Government, Edinburgh. 2011 http://www.child-smile.org.uk/professionals/
information-for-dental-practice-staff.aspx. Accessed 31 Mar 2018.
34. Elouafkaoui P, Bonetti D, Clarkson J, Stirling D, Young L, Cassie H. Is further
intervention required to translate caries prevention and management
recommendations into practice? Br Dent J. 2015;218(1):E1.
35. http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/SIMD. Accessed 12 Sept 2017.
36. Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme. Oral health assessment
and review. Dundee: Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme; 2012.
37. Michie S, Johnston M, Abraham C, Lawton R, Parker D, Walker A,
Psychological Theory G. Making psychological theory useful for
implementing evidence-based practice: a consensus approach. Qual Saf
Health Care. 2005;14:26–33.
38. French SD, Green SE, O’Connor DA, McKenzie JE, Francis JJ, Michie S,
Buchbinder R, Schattner P, Spike N, Grimshaw JM. Developing theory-
informed behaviour change interventions to implement evidence into
practice: a systematic approach using the Theoretical Domains Framework.
Implement Sci. 2012;7:38.
39. Cane J, O’Connor D, Michie S. Validation of the theoretical domains
framework for use in behaviour change and implementation research.
Implement Sci. 2012;7:37.
40. Francis J, O’Connor D, Curran J. Theories of behaviour change synthesised
into a set of theoretical groupings: introducing a thematic series on the
theoretical domains framework. Implement Sci. 2012;7:35.
41. Atkins L, Francis J, Islam R, O’Connor D, Patey A, Ivers N, Foy R, Duncan EM,
Colquhoun H, Grimshaw JM, et al. A guide to using the Theoretical
Domains Framework of behaviour change to investigate implementation
problems. Implement Sci. 2017;12:77.
42. Beenstock J, Sniehotta F, White M, Bell R, Milne E, Araujo-Soares V. What
helps and hinders midwives in engaging with pregnant women about
stopping smoking? A cross-sectional survey of perceived implementation
difficulties among midwives in the North East of England. Implement Sci.
2012;7:36.
43. Islam R, Tinmouth AT, Francis JJ, Brehaut JC, Born J, Stockton C, Stanworth
SJ, Eccles MP, Cuthbertson BH, Hyde C, Grimshaw JM. A cross-country
comparison of intensive care physicians’ beliefs about their transfusion
behaviour: a qualitative study using the theoretical domains framework.
Implement Sci. 2012;7:93.
44. Gnich W, Bonetti D, Sherriff A, Sharma S, Conway DI, Macpherson LM. Use
of the theoretical domains framework to further understanding of what
influences application of fluoride varnish to children’s teeth: a national
survey of general dental practitioners in Scotland. Community Dent Oral
Epidemiol. 2015;43:272–81.
45. Templeton AR, Young L, Bish A, Gnich W, Cassie H, Treweek S, Bonetti D,
Stirling D, Macpherson L, McCann S, et al. Patient-, organization-, and
system-level barriers and facilitators to preventive oral health care: a
convergent mixed-methods study in primary dental care. Implement Sci.
2016;11:015–0366.
46. Taylor N, Lawton R, Conner M. Development and initial validation of the
determinants of physical activity questionnaire. Int J Behav Nutr Phys Act.
2013;10:74.
47. Central Evaluation and Research Team. Childsmile national headline data.
Glasgow: University of Glasgow; 2012.
48. Bonetti D, Chalkley M, Clarkson J, Tilley C, Young L. The effect of activity-
based payment on dentists’ activity: evidence from a natural experiment in
the UK National Health Service. In: SIRE Discussion Papers. Dundee:
University of Dundee; 2008.
49. Jacobsen CB, Hvitved J, Andersen LB. Command and motivation: how the
perception of external interventions relates to intrinsic motivation and
public service motivation. Publ Adm. 2014;92:790–806.
50. Bussieres AE, Patey AM, Francis JJ, Sales AE, Grimshaw JM. Identifying factors
likely to influence compliance with diagnostic imaging guideline
recommendations for spine disorders among chiropractors in North
America: a focus group study using the Theoretical Domains Framework.
Implement Sci. 2012;7:82.
51. McSherry LA, Dombrowski SU, Francis JJ, Murphy J, Martin CM, O’Leary JJ,
Sharp L, Group A. ‘It’s a can of worms’: understanding primary care
practitioners’ behaviours in relation to HPV using the theoretical domains
framework. Implement Sci. 2012;7:73.
52. Curran JA, Grimshaw JM, Hayden JA, Campbell B. Knowledge translation
research: the science of moving research into policy and practice. J Contin
Educ Heal Prof. 2011;31:174–80.
53. Bonetti DL. Evidence not practised: the underutilisation of preventive fissure
sealants. Br Dent J. 2014;216:409–13.
54. Bonetti D, Pitts NB, Eccles M, Grimshaw J, Johnston M, Steen N, Glidewell L,
Thomas R, Maclennan G, Clarkson JE, Walker A. Applying psychological
theory to evidence-based clinical practice: identifying factors predictive of
taking intra-oral radiographs. Soc Sci Med. 2006;63:1889–99.
55. Bonetti D, Johnston M, Clarkson JE, Grimshaw J, Pitts NB, Eccles M, Steen N,
Thomas R, Maclennan G, Glidewell L, Walker A. Applying psychological
theories to evidence-based clinical practice: identifying factors predictive of
placing preventive fissure sealants. Implement Sci. 2010;5:25.
56. Phillips CJ, Marshall AP, Chaves NJ, Jankelowitz SK, Lin IB, Loy CT, Rees G,
Sakzewski L, Thomas S, To TP, et al. Experiences of using the Theoretical
Domains Framework across diverse clinical environments: a qualitative
study. J Multidiscip Healthc. 2015;8:139–46.
57. Moore GF, Audrey S, Barker M, Bond L, Bonell C, Hardeman W, Moore L,
O’Cathain A, Tinati T, Wight D, Baird J. Process evaluation of complex
interventions: Medical Research Council guidance. BMJ. 2015;350:h1258.
58. Huijg JM, Gebhardt WA, Crone MR, Dusseldorp E, Presseau J. Discriminant
content validity of a theoretical domains framework questionnaire for use in
implementation research. Implement Sci. 2014;9:11.
Gnich et al. Implementation Science  (2018) 13:95 Page 12 of 12
